

Textual Anticipation and the Putative Reader in Persuasive Discourse

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Abstract: The notion that ‘monologic’ written texts construe for themselves a putative addressee (variously termed the ‘ideal’, ‘imagined’, ‘virtual’, ‘intended’, ‘model’ or ‘mock’ reader) has received a great deal of scholarly attention, initially by scholars of literary fiction and subsequently by discourse analysts more generally. This paper is concerned with putative-reader positioning in persuasive texts and with how, through observing the relationships of alignment and dis-alignment which the author enters into with this putative reader, it is possible to better understand the rhetorical workings of these texts. More specifically, it demonstrates how, through an analysis of which beliefs, expectations and attitudes the author projects onto this putative addressee it is possible to better understand how such a text may be persuasive, to more systematically describe the ‘compliant readings’ associated with a text and to more thoroughly deal with ‘ideological’ workings of persuasive texts as they naturalize particular value systems and world views. In outlining and demonstrating an approach to analyses of putative-addressee positioning, the paper draws on prior work in literary criticism scholarship and in university composition studies. Its primary focus, however, is on developing prior work on the putative addressee in the appraisal-framework literature, in particular work which has attended to the role of the resources of dialogistic positioning (ENGAGEMENT) in ‘writing the reader into the text’.

Key words: persona; persuasion; dialogism; readership

1. Introduction

One widely deployed application of the appraisal framework has been in the exploration of how persona and identity are enacted linguistically. Consequently there is a growing body of literature on the association between persona/identity and how speakers/writers use positively and negatively attitudinal meanings, how they intensify or mitigate these meanings and how they negotiate these meanings dialogistically — that is to say, analyses which track uses of what, in the appraisal-framework literature, are termed ATTITUDE, GRADUATION and ENGAGEMENT. In contrast, this paper is concerned with what might be termed the ‘other side of the coin’ of discursively performed persona — what has variously been termed the ‘implied’, ‘intended’, ‘ideal’, or ‘putative’ reader/ addressee. (Other related terms include ‘inside reader’, ‘created reader’, ‘the mock reader’ and the ‘narratee’, see for example Booth, 1961; Gibson, 1950; Prince, 1980). Here we are concerned with ‘the reader in the text’ (Kress, 1985; Thompson, 2012) — the reader/addressee which a text construes for itself as it directly or indirectly signals authorial assumptions and expectations as to what are, or what potentially are, this imagined addressee’s circumstances, experiences, beliefs, understandings, attitudes, dispositions and values. Thus Schmid states: ‘the term “implied reader” designates ... the author’s image of the recipient that is fixed

and objectified in the text by specific indexical signs' (Schmid, 2014 : 301). Hasan observes that for the 'virtual addressee' of 'monologic texts', 'all aspects of the interactant relation — their respective status, their social distance, the specific attributes of the addressee — are logically entirely created by the language of the text, none having a basis in reality for obvious reasons' (Hasan, 1999 : 238). In a 1950s edition of the journal *College English*, Gibson made similar proposals in coining the label 'mock reader'.

I am arguing, then, that there are two readers distinguishable in every literary experience. First, there is the "real" individual upon whose crossed knee rests the open volume, and whose personality is as complex and ultimately inexpressible as any dead poet's. Second, there is the fictitious reader — I shall call him the "mock reader" — whose mask and costume the individual takes on in order to experience the language. The mock reader is an artifact, controlled, simplified, abstracted out of the chaos of day-to-day sensation. (Gibson, 1950 : 2)

In his influential, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, Booth similarly observed that: 'the author creates, in short, an image of himself and another image of his reader; he makes his reader, as he makes his second self' (Booth, 1961 : 138).

While this putative addressee has received a degree of attention in literary-fiction scholarship and particularly in narratology studies, it has received considerably less attention in linguistic-analysis based discourse studies generally. Within the appraisal-theory literature it has received some attention (see for example, Martin and White, 2005 : 95 ; White and Sano, 2006 ; White, 2010), but still considerably less attention than discursively performed persona/identity. This is perhaps because the putative addressee, as textual effect, is considerably more elusive analytically than textually enacted persona. Although this putative addressee may be directly addressed and characterised (with the speaker/writer overtly attaching properties, beliefs and attitudes to them), this is less often the case, at least with respect to the types of texts with which this paper will be concerned — mass communicative persuasive texts such as journalistic commentary and political pronouncements. Here the construal of the putative addressee is mostly a matter of authorial implication and signalled authorial assumption.

There are good reasons for attending to the putative reader in text. If we are interested in textual persona/identity (as many discourse analysts are) then the putative addressee is of obvious relevance, given that persona is necessarily a dialogistic construct, a matter not just of the values and beliefs espoused by the speaker/writer but also a matter of the values and beliefs they project onto those they address. As well, through describing this putative addressee and the virtual relations which the author enters into with them, we are able to enhance accounts of the bases on which texts may be persuasive — accounts of what beliefs, attitudes and expectations a reader needs to bring to a text to find it argumentatively reasonable or well-founded. In this way it becomes possible to deal systematically with what Martin and White have termed 'compliant readings' (2005 : 62) — 'the reading position naturalised by the co-selection of meanings in a text'. Additionally, through the tracking of what beliefs and attitudes are projected onto the addressee, more can be said of the 'ideological' workings of texts, of how they naturalize particular value systems and world views.

This paper is novel in that it offers a development of prior appraisal-framework based scholarship on

the putative reader (see citations above). More specifically it picks up on the recent, more extended treatment of the role of options within the engagement system outlined in White, 2020. There, in dealing with the putative addressee in mass-communicative persuasive texts, I offered an approach by which the putative reader is understood to be positioned with respect to each and every proposition advanced by the author. More specifically, I set out a framework for tracking how authors, by dint of the choices they make as to dialogistic positioning, construe the putative addressee as (1) ‘likeminded’ (i. e. presented as finding unproblematic the belief, version of events, interpretation or evaluation currently being advanced by the author), or (2) ‘uncommitted’ (i. e. allowance made for the possibility that the addressee may not be committed to the proposition currently being advanced by the author but is nevertheless potentially persuadable) or as (3) ‘unlikeminded’ (i. e. presented as potentially at odds with the author re the current proposition — actually or likely to question or reject the position being advanced by the author at that point in the text).

It needs to be noted at this point that this paper is only concerned with the positioning of addressees vis-à-vis their putative beliefs, understandings, expectations and attitudes. That is to say, the paper does not attend to the communicative mechanisms by which the putative addressee may be implicitly characterised with respect to such features as their assumed broader cultural background, their life stage, their gender, sexual orientation, education, and so on. Also, I will generally adopt, as already indicated, the term ‘putative addressee/reader’, rather than any of the alternatives mentioned above. This is because (1) this was the term employed by Martin and White (2005: 210) in their seminal work on the language of evaluation and because (2) the lexeme ‘putative’ is associated with a sense of provisionality with what is being advocated by some external source. Thus, we capture the sense that the ‘putative’ addressee is a construct being ‘proposed’ or ‘advocated’ by the authorial voice, even while such ‘advocacy’ is open to question or resistance. I have also chosen not to use the terms ‘model reader’ (Eco, 1979) or ‘ideal reader’ (e. g. Morley, 1980; Kress 1985) because these terms are typically used when dealing with the addressee as a textually global construct, as a complex of characteristics and values implicated of the reader by the text in its totality. Thus Kress proposes: ‘The text attempts to coerce the reader, by its “obviousness” and “naturalness”, to become its ideal reader, to step into the reading position constructed for the reader in the text.’ (1985: 36). While the approach I outline here is compatible with an interest in investigating the global ‘reading position constructed for the reader’, my focus is a more local one, attending, at least as a first step, to how the addressee is positioned vis-à-vis single propositions and smaller portions of text. Accordingly, in the first instance, the analysis attends to how the addressee may be variably positioned as likeminded, uncommitted or unlikeminded re the proposition currently under consideration. Of course, such analyses can provide a basis for findings as to the broader ‘reading position’ favoured by the text and as to the nature of the addressee as the text’s ‘model’ or ‘ideal’ reader. Similarly, such analysis can assist in the unpacking of what is entailed in Martin’s notions of ‘compliant’ and ‘resistant’ readings (Martin, 1994).

With the above objectives in mind, I offer an analysis of an opinion column published in one of Australia’s more influential broadsheet newspapers, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, on a topic of political and ideological import — the invasion of Gaza by the Israeli military in July 2014, in retaliation for rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas in the days immediately prior. According to reports released subsequently by the

UN, the action resulted in more than 2000 Palestinian deaths (the majority of whom were civilians) and the deaths of 67 Israeli soldiers and six Israeli civilians^①. The legitimacy/morality of the action (labelled ‘Operation Protective Edge’) was hotly debated in the international media with arguments being advanced both for and against. In this piece (accessible at <https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/gaza-and-israel-why-i-will-not-be-silent-20140727-zxdvn.html>), the author, Nick Dyrenfurth, mounts a case in support of the action essentially on the basis that (1) criticisms of the Israeli government’s actions as ‘disproportionate’ are unwarranted and illegitimate and (2) that recent protests against the action are ‘hypocritical’ and ‘dangerous’ in creating an environment which fosters anti-Semitism. This is while, as a subsidiary line of discussion, he indicates his strong opposition to the then ruling party of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and to the program of support for Jewish settlement in the West Bank.

This text has been chosen firstly on account of the seriousness of its subject matter and secondly because, unlike a good deal of the commentary published in the mainstream media, it is not entirely a ‘flag waving exercise’, in which the addressee is very largely assumed to share the author’s beliefs and values (i. e. mostly construed as likeminded). It is rather more nuanced than this and accordingly facilitates a discussion of a range of mechanisms by which the putative addressee is variously construed as likeminded, uncommitted (but potentially persuadable) and unlikeminded.

2. Textually-global positioning of the addressee in overtly persuasive texts

Texts of this type are organised around a central contentious proposition (the ‘thesis’ of the argument being advanced) for which the author argues by providing various justifications or motivations. The author thus presents as seeking to win over the addressee to the validity, fairness or truth of the author’s thesis.^② Thus the addressee is construed as potentially not sharing the author’s viewpoint on account, perhaps, of being previously unfamiliar with the issue under consideration and hence not having yet formed a view, or perhaps on account of still being undecided on the issue, or perhaps on account of having come to the text with a contrary viewpoint. The addressee is thus construed by the text as a whole as uncommitted or as potentially ‘unlikeminded’ by dint of the text’s central, overriding purpose — that of ‘persuading’. That is to say, for the author to adopt the communicative role of ‘persuader’ is necessarily to position the addressee interpersonally as ‘persuadee’ — i. e. to project onto the addressee the possibility that they do not share the central proposition being advanced by the text as a whole. At the same time, and equally obviously, the addressee is construed as ‘persuadable’, as potentially susceptible to being won over to the merits of the author’s viewpoint on account of the justifications and motivations supplied for the purpose of winning them over. This, then is a textually global positioning effect.

In the Dyrenfurth piece, this persuasive purpose is primarily pursued in three paragraphs located in the middle of article.

^① These findings are taken from a report by the United Nations Human Rights Council published in 2015 — see <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/coigazaconflict/pages/reportcoigaza.aspx>. (accessed March 1, 2020)

^② They are broadly similar to either the texts which in the Sydney Genre School literature are treated as instances of the ‘Exposition’ genre or as instances of ‘Challenge’, although they do not always clearly operate with the same genre stagings associated with ‘Exposition’ and ‘Challenge’ (Martin JR and Rose D (2008) *Genre Relations — Mapping Culture*. London: Equinox.).

...I am deeply troubled by the response of Australians and much of the West on two counts. [criticism of the Israel military's land and air attack on Gaza, for being brutal, inhumane and 'disproportionate'] First, what do Israel's critics expect? The crisis did not begin a few weeks ago with events in the West Bank. Since 2005, when Israel withdrew from the Gaza strip, Hamas has indiscriminately lobbed some 14,000 rockets and mortars over the border with the specific aim of killing as many Jews as possible. It remains committed to the annihilation of Israel ... [It] is a fascistic death cult that operates within civilian areas including schools. It has rejected ceasefire offers proposed by Egypt, accepted by Jerusalem, and supported by the Palestinian Authority, Arab League, United Nations, and blatantly violated humanitarian cessations.

Again, I ask, what do Israel's critics want? Should it ignore the rockets and weapons-smuggling tunnels? The IDF is exercising 'disproportionate force', some allege — what on earth does this phrase actually mean? Would a few hundred Jewish Israeli deaths even up the blood-soaked scoreboard? Perhaps Israel should turn off its highly effective Iron Dome Defence system for a few hours and let the rockets do their handiwork?

Second, the hysterical hypocrisy is sickening and dangerous too. Does posting Facebook photos of dead Palestinian children serve any meaningful purpose? Israel is not Nazi Germany reincarnated, as numerous pro-Palestinian rallies allege. Words have consequences. Synagogues and Jewish businesses in Europe are being attacked. Crowds chant 'Gas the Jews'.

It is worth noting in passing that, as is often the case with journalistic opinion pieces of this type, the central thesis (i. e. that recent criticisms of this attack by Israel are ill-considered, unjustified and unfair) is not clearly stated. As is the case with much opinion journalism, it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the issue or debate with which the piece is concerned and that it can be left to the reader to infer from the text the author's thesis — the contentious proposition which is the argumentative 'point' of the piece.

Putting aside for the moment the complication that Dyrenfurth makes frequent use of rhetorical questions in his argumentation (whereby the reader is relied on to supply particular responses), I propose that the argument mounted can be summarised thusly. Justification 1: The criticism of Israel for this attack on Gaza is wrong (and the military action justified) because the attack was mounted only after Israel had been subjected to many rocket and mortar attacks over an extended period. Justification 2: The criticism is wrong because Hamas, the organisation responsible for these rocket attacks, is a 'fascistic death cult' committed to the destruction of Israel. Justification 3: The criticism is wrong because the notion that a military action such as this might be judged to be 'disproportionate' is ridiculous and inapplicable. Justification 4: The criticisms are wrong because they have resulted in an upsurge of anti-Semitism around the world, even in places like Germany.

3. Going deeper — argumentation, entailments and author-addressee likemindedness

The analysis to this point thus demonstrates how the text, by dint of its argumentative structure and purpose, construes an addressee who may not align with the author in the view that the criticisms of Israel

being mounted are unfair and unjustified (which , of course , has as its potential corollary the view that the attack on Gaza is indeed justified.) There is more at stake here , however , in terms of positioning of the putative addressee which becomes apparent when we consider the underlying logic of the argumentation. Here the notion of the ‘ warrant ’ as developed in the argumentation theory of Stephen Toulmin is useful (Toulmin , 2003). Toulmin notes that argumentation involves not only the contentious proposition being advanced and the justification which is presented in support of this proposition , but also an underlying , often unstated belief or set of beliefs by which the justification has the power to ‘ entail ’ or lead logically to the argued-for proposition it is intended to motivate. By way of an example , consider what is entailed logically in the following excerpt from the article.

I am deeply troubled by the response of Australians and much of the West on two counts. First , what do Israel ’ s critics expect? The crisis did not begin a few weeks ago with events in the West Bank. Since 2005 , when Israel withdrew from the Gaza strip , Hamas has indiscriminately lobbed some 14 ,000 rockets and mortars over the border with the specific aim of killing as many Jews as possible.

The persuasiveness/unpersuasiveness of this turns on certain underlying beliefs as to what levels of provocation and/or threat merit the level of violent reaction/response being meted out by the Israeli military at this time. More specifically , Dyrenfurth relies on the addressee sharing with him the ‘ warrant ’ that the ‘ lobbing of 14 ,000 rockets and mortars ’ at Israel over the past decade with the ‘ specific aim of killing as many Jews as possible ’ obviously means Israel ’ s current action is justified. The warrant relied on , and hence the assumption by which this particular argument is to be viewed as ‘ well-founded ’ , is one by which this particular provocation is seen as unproblematically justifying a military response of the current order. In assuming that it unproblematically holds for the addressee (as opposed to recognising it as potentially problematic and providing additional reasoning in support of it) the author projects this belief on to the addressee. They are construed as persuadable to the author ’ s viewpoint that the Israeli attack on Gaza is justified once apprised of the information that Hamas has been bombarding Israel with many thousands of rockets with a view to ‘ killing as many Jews as possible ’ . At the same time , of course , any reader for whom this entailment does not hold — for whom the fact that Hamas has ‘ lobbed 14 ,000 rockets and mortars ’ at Israel does not unproblematically justify Israel ’ s current attack on Gaza — is excluded from the text ’ s putative readership. They are not the ‘ intended ’ or ‘ imagined ’ addressee.

It should , of course , be noted that Dyrenfurth offers no information on the extent of the damage , casualties or fatalities inflicted either by Hamas ’ prior rocket and mortar attacks or by Israel ’ s current land and air attack on Gaza. The ‘ logic ’ of the argument is held to hold regardless of any such consideration of the extent of the damage and suffering experienced by either side.

The same point applies for the other arguments mounted in the section cited above. Consider , by way of further exemplification , this further excerpt.

Second , the hysterical hypocrisy is sickening and dangerous too. Does posting Facebook photos of dead Palestinian children serve any meaningful purpose? Israel is not Nazi Germany reincarnated , as numerous pro-Palestinian rallies allege. Words have consequences. Synagogues and Jewish businesses in Europe are being attacked. Crowds chant “ Gas the Jews ” .

This has the potential to operate as an argument in support of the author's proposition that the criticisms of Israel are wrong on the basis of the assumption (the underlying 'warrant') that it is the criticisms of Israel's attack which have prompted these acts of extreme and violent anti-Semitism and that when criticisms of Israeli military actions are followed by such acts of anti-Semitism, then the criticisms should not be countenanced. Again, since such logical entailments are 'taken for granted', being held to hold unproblematically, then the addressee is construed as aligned with the author in being subject to them.

4. Likemindedness and assumed author-addressee concurrence

As mentioned above, there are some further aspects of the author's argumentation which also construe the addressee as likeminded — his frequent use of a type of rhetorical question which carries the assumptions that the addressee will align with the author in answering these pseudo-questions. In the ENGAGEMENT system of the appraisal framework, such questions are treated as one of the mechanisms by which 'concurrence' (i. e. likemindedness) is indicated between author and addressee (Martin and White, 2005: 122). Such questions were a salient feature of the Dyrenfurth's argumentation, as already excerpted above and repeated here for ease of reference.

Which brings us to the tragedy unfolding in Gaza. ... Like many others, I struggle to reconcile the military logic of 'Operation Protective Edge' with the appalling loss of life. ... Still I am deeply troubled by the response of Australians and much of the West on two counts. First, what do Israel's critics expect? ... Should it ignore the rockets and weapons-smuggling tunnels? ... Would a few hundred Jewish Israeli deaths even up the blood-soaked scoreboard?

Here the textual logic 'relies' on the reader supplying such answers as 'What Israel's critics want is unreasonable/unrealistic', 'No, Israel should not/cannot ignore the rockets and tunnels'. The putative addressee is thus construed as of a view to supply such answers, as being of the same mind as the author in this regard.

Along similar lines he offers:

Again, I ask, what do Israel's critics want? Should it ignore the rockets and weapons-smuggling tunnels? The IDF is exercising "disproportionate force", some allege — what on earth does this phrase actually mean? Would a few hundred Jewish Israeli deaths even up the blood-soaked scoreboard? Second, the hysterical hypocrisy is sickening and dangerous too. Does posting Facebook photos of dead Palestinian children serve any meaningful purpose?

The putative addressee is construed as sharing with the author the view that, 'Israel should not ignore the rockets and weapons-smuggling tunnels', that 'A few hundred Jewish Israeli deaths would not even up the blood-soaked scoreboard' and that "posting Facebook photos of dead Palestinian children serves no meaningful purpose.' The implication, then, is that author and addressee are likeminded as to the unreasonableness and falsity of the current criticisms of this military action.

As well there is the question 'what does this phrase [disproportionate force] mean:'. While it presents the author as bemused by this term, it can also suggest an expectation by the author that the reader would equally be at a loss and might be posing a similar query. Author-addressee likemindedness is

thus suggested around the view that this notion of ‘disproportionate force’ is necessarily so ill-considered and vague as to be without value in consideration of the rights and wrongs of military action. ^③

In association with this use of rhetorical questions (as an element in the argumentation) there is what can be seen as a layering of assumed addressee likemindedness. The two levels are as follows: (first layer) the addressee is construed as likeminded as a result of the underlying ‘warrants’ being relied on and (second layer) as a result of the author’s use of these likemindedness-assuming rhetorical questions. This is revealed when we consider how the specific argumentation being developed here might have been advanced without the use of such rhetorical questions — for example

[invented alternative]

I am deeply troubled by the response of Australians and much of the West [in condemning the Israeli military action] because Israel cannot ignore the fact that Hamas continues to launch rocket attacks on Israel and to build weapons-smuggling tunnels.

In this case, the putative addressee likemindedness is single layered — a matter of the logical entailment involved — i. e. the entailment by which the rocket attacks are understood to lead directly to the conclusion that the Israeli action is justified and hence the criticisms are ill-founded. But when the justification is couched as a rhetorical question to which the addressee is expected to supply a particular answer — ‘Should [Israel] ignore the rockets and weapons-smuggling tunnels?’ — then there is this additional layer of construed likemindedness, with the addressee constructed as sharing with the author the view that (1) Israel ‘cannot ignore’ the Hamas rocket attacks and that (2) it is right that this action (i. e. ‘not ignoring’) should be a military action with the degree of force and damage then being undertaken by Israel.

Author-addressee concurrence (likemindedness) can also be construed when author and reader are presented as finding some event or situation counter-expected, as sharing a response of surprise or shock. For example, Dyrenfurth offers:

On Saturday a cartoon featuring an all-powerful hook-nosed Jew appeared in a mainstream [Australian] newspaper. Yes, in 2014.

Here the tag ‘Yes, in 2014’ conveys the author’s own sense of shock and dismay at this event and the ‘Yes’ presents the author’s observation as offered in agreement with a similar, anticipated sense of shock on the part of the putative reader.

As discussed in Martin and White (2015: 122), author-reader concurrence can also be construed via the use of adjuncts such as *of course*, *plainly* and *obviously*. Dyrenfurth makes no use of such formulations.

5. Likemindedness and ‘monoglossic’ assertion

In a 1988 paper for the *Journal of Advanced Composition*, Ewald, proposed that the notion of the

^③ According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘proportionality’ in military conflict is understood in the following terms: ‘The principle of proportionality prohibits attacks against military objectives which are expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. In other words, the principle of proportionality seeks to limit damage caused by military operations by requiring that the effects of the means and methods of warfare used must not be disproportionate to the military advantage sought.’ (<https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/proportionality> - accessed 1 March 2020).

‘implied reader’, as discussed earlier in the context of literary fiction and narrative studies, could and should be applied to the analysis of persuasive texts such as journalistic commentary, political speeches and academic essays. She proposed that beliefs and attitudes can be projected onto the addressee when a text constructs for itself an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy.

One way the implied reader functions in these essays is to highlight a "them/us" dichotomy between those who think as the author does and those who don't. The implied reader, of course, is among those who do. (Ewald, 1988 : 170)

Interestingly Ewald, didn't offer much by way of explanation as to why the implied reader is ‘of course’ among those who think ‘as the author does’. Her assumption seemed to be that when the author advances a negative view of some situation, action, or person(s) it is necessarily the case that the reader is thereby construed as sharing with the author this same negative attitude. Thus, for example, she assumes that in the following extract from Rachel Carson's celebrated *The Silent Spring*, the addressee is necessarily construed as having the same negative view as the author vis-à-vis the use of insecticides in agriculture.

The crusade to create a chemically sterile, insect-free world seems to have engendered a fanatic zeal on the part of many specialists and most of the so-called control agencies. On every hand there is evidence that those engaged in spraying operations exercise a ruthless power. ... (Carson 1962, in Ewald, 1988 : 170)

She didn't, however, provide any account of the specific linguistic choices which are implicated here, nor did she deal with what are a number of complications around just how the reader is actually being positioning attitudinally. There are, in fact, a number of attitudinal assessments being advanced in this extract — (1) that there is a ‘crusade’ to create a ‘chemically sterile world’ by removing all insects, that the experts involved are motivated by a ‘fanatical zeal’ and that those involved in using chemicals in this way ‘exercise ruthless power’. Closer examination of the linguistic arrangements in play reveals that the reader is being positioning somewhat differently with respect to these related (though different) attitudinal assessments. I propose, however, that what Ewald seems to have been responding to was the fact that Carson advances at least some of these attitudinal propositions via what the appraisal literature would term ‘monoglossic’ formulations. These are ‘bare assertions’ which, following Bakhtinian notions of heteroglossia and dialogism, can be understood as involving a choice by the speaker not to recognise or engage with the multiplicity of other voices and associated value positions in which all utterances are located. Such formulations are thus ‘monoglossic’ in the sense that the voice of the speaker operates in isolation from the heteroglossic environment in which, as Bakhtin has argued, all verbal communication is located (Bakhtin, 1981). The appraisal literature recognises two sub-types of monoglossic assertion — those which ‘assert’ and those which presuppose — and here I make the case that they both have the potential to construe the addressee as likeminded. I explore this proposition in connection with Ewald's discussion of the *Silent Spring* excerpt by way of a lead into a discussion of Dyrenfurth's use of this resource to construe the addressee of his opinion piece as likeminded with respect to some key propositions.

5.1 Presupposition

As widely dealt with in the philosophy of language and pragmatics literature, presupposition involves formulations by which a particular proposition is treated as ‘taken for granted’ or a ‘given’, as an

understanding, belief or attitude which is taken as universally held or agreed upon. (See, for example, Kempson, 1975; Carston, 1998; Simon-Vandenberg, 2007 et al. ; Delogu, 2009).

In the Carson excerpt above from *The Silent Spring*, the proposition that there is a crusade to produce a chemically sterile, insect-free world is presupposed — via the nominalisation ‘crusade’ and its post-modification. That people are ‘crusading’ in this way is thus treated as ‘a given’ — a view which the reader will necessarily hold. Interestingly, there is nothing here by which the author ‘inscribes’ (i. e. overtly asserts) a negative assessment of such an objective (endeavouring to produce a chemically sterile, insect-free world). Instead, the author relies on the reader sharing with her the cultural frame by which a world which is ‘chemically sterile’ and ‘insect-free’ is to be viewed negatively^④. While this cultural frame is presumably very widely held indeed, it is nevertheless a cultural frame which conceivably might not be shared by all. Thus, we observe here the role played by attitudinal invocation in putative-reader positioning. The textual logic by which ‘crusading for a chemically-sterile world’ entails a negative assessment of those who so ‘crusade’ construes a putative reader for whom this ‘logic’ holds — i. e. a reader who subscribes to this particular attitudinal entailment.

It seems likely that Carson’s presupposing this proposition is one reason why Ewald concludes that the reader is construed as necessarily thinking ‘as the author’ does — a position necessarily at odds with those who are supporters of the widespread use of insecticides (Ewald’s ‘them’). It is not the negative assessment of itself which positions the addressee in this way, but rather the manner of expression — the choice of presenting it as a taken-for-granted, universally accepted ‘given’.

In the Dyrenfurth article, we observe several examples of negative assessment which are ‘presupposed’ in this way, and hence construe the addressee as likeminded. For example:

I’m not blind to Israel’s faults. I deplore the rightwards shift of the nation’s political culture. I mourn the collapse of Labor Zionism.

Here presupposing formulations treat as ‘givens’ (as unproblematic and dialogistically ‘inert’) the propositions that Israel has ‘faults’, that there has been a ‘rightwards shift’ in its political culture and a ‘collapse in Labor Zionism’. In all three cases the ‘presupposition’ involves the use of nominalisations (‘Israel’s faults’, ‘rightward shift’, and ‘collapse’) along with clausal arrangements by which the propositions in question are made inaccessible to direct argumentation.

The ideological functionality of such presupposition in ‘normalizing’ or ‘naturalizing’ particular value positions has received wide treatment in the Critical Discourse Analysis literature (see, for example Sbisák, 1999; Van Dijk, 2003; Bekalu, 2006; Polyzou, 2015) and here I largely rely on insights arising from that scholarship, even while wanting to point out that such a ‘naturalizing’ has a dialogistic potential — i. e. to project the particular value position onto the construed reader in that it is this construed reader who is ‘taken for granted’ in this way.

It is to be noted that in this article this ‘taking the reader for granted’ occurs with propositions which in some cases assume a positive view of Israel as a state (i. e. praising its past achievements), in some

^④ It is to be noted that to describe someone as ‘crusading’ can invoke either a positive or negative assessment, depending on the co-text and the cultural frame being referenced. This is also the case for descriptions of some situations as ‘sterile’ — often positive when the term is used literally and typically negative when used metaphorically.

cases assume a negative view of the current Israeli government (i. e. are negatively disposed towards the then current Israeli Prime Minister), and in other cases assume a negative view of those commentators currently criticising the Israeli government. Cases where a positive view of Israel's past achievements is presupposed have already be presented. Examples of cases where a negative view is presupposed are provided below.

I struggle to reconcile the military logic of "Operation Protective Edge" with the appalling loss of life. Benjamin Netanyahu's quixotic aim of bringing "quiet" to the region is unlikely to abate the cycle of violence.

Of note here is that the author presupposes the inscribed negative assessment of Netanyahu's aim as 'quixotic', thereby construing a putative reader for whom such a viewpoint is unproblematic, as a view of the Prime Minister which can be taken for granted.

In the following extract, a negative assessment of those critical of the Israeli military action is similarly presupposed — specifically that those being critical of Israel are being hypocritical in a hysterical way.

Second, the hysterical hypocrisy [of those condemning the military action] is sickening and dangerous too.

In this, then, we note that, at least at these points in the text, the putative reader is variously construed as having a positive view of Israel's past achievements, as regarding the current Prime Minister as misguided in at least some aspects of his behaviour, and as holding a negative view of at least some of the actions of those who are critical of Israel for its current military action.

5.2 Bare assertion

The bare assertion is the second 'monoglossic' formulation which, it is proposed, construes propositions as unproblematic for the putative reader — i. e. interpretable as implying that the reader already holds the view in question or will unproblematically accept it as fair, reasonable and/or well-founded. There is just one instance of a bare assertion in the extract from *The Silent Spring* cited above. It involves a complication in terms of how the reader is being positioned and accordingly I will return to this later. With respect to the Dyrenfurth article, what is meant by 'bare assertion' is exemplified in the following utterances.

The world has much to learn from Israel's scientific, technological and environmental endeavours.

The modern revival of the Hebrew language is ... extraordinary.

The West Bank settlements are a cancer eating away at Israel's democratic soul.

Hamas is a fascistic death cult that operates within civilian areas including schools.

These are 'bare assertions' (i. e. monoglossic) in that, for example, they are not modalised or attributed to external sources, they do not involve authorial emphasis directed at challenging alternative positions, they do not involve the negation of alternative propositions, and they do not involve any efforts by the author to offer a ground or a justification for the attitudes being advanced. Thus the monoglossic assertion, 'The modern revival of Hebrew is extraordinary' stands in opposition, for example to the following invented alternative formulations, which are termed 'heteroglossic' in an appraisal-framework analysis on the basis that they involve some engagement with, or recognition of other voices, alternative

viewpoints or potential responses.

In my view/I believe the modern revival of Hebrew is extraordinary. Many people feel the modern revival of Hebrew is extraordinary. [grounding the proposition in the contingent subjectivity of the author or of some external source]

The facts of the matter are that the modern revival of Hebrew is extraordinary. [heightened emphasis on the part of the author directed at heading off some alternative viewpoint]

By any measure the modern revival of Hebrew was extraordinary because it hadn't been spoken as a mother tongue for over a 1000 years. [the attitudinal proposition bolstered with grounds/ persuasive justification]

Admittedly the modern revival of Hebrew is extraordinary. [speaker presents as reluctantly coming to personally hold the view of some previously adversarial voice]

The modern revival of Hebrew is actually not all that extraordinary. [invoking an alternative viewpoint while at the same time rejecting that viewpoint]

As indicated above, all such formulations are 'heteroglossic' in the Bakhtinian sense — and hence stand in contradistinction to monoglossic bare assertions — in that they do recognise, engage with, or allow for alternative voices and viewpoints. Thus the 'meaning' or functionality of the bare assertion, as a choice as to how to formulate a proposition, is to be understood in terms of contrast with these various 'heteroglossic' options, as a choice with particular communicative consequences which sets it apart from these other available options. With respect to the extracts cited above, the effect, of course, is to present as unproblematic for the addressee assessments which are both positive and negative towards Israel, and very strongly negative of Hamas. Thus the implication or expectation entailed by the text is that the addressee will find unexceptional a stance towards Israel which, on the one hand, views positively its past achievements but is critical of at least some aspects of its current politics, and, in parallel with this, will find unexceptional a view which is entirely dismissive of the legitimacy of Hamas. Significantly, then, these are attitudes which are never justified, argued for, or construed as contested. They are treated as a taken-for-granted attitudinal backdrop shared by author and addressee.

To return briefly to Ewald's treatment of *The Silent Spring* excerpt, I note that the only proposition which can potentially be treated as a bare assertion is that about the existence of certain 'evidence': 'On every hand there is evidence that those engaged in spraying operations exercise a ruthless power.' Thus Carson didn't barely assert that 'those engaged in spraying operations exercise a ruthless power', choosing instead to modalise the proposition in the sense that 'evidence' is not always to be treated as definitive proof.^⑤ In this, then, the addressee is only construed as likeminded with respect to there being this 'evidence' of the 'ruthless power' of those of engage in spraying, and not with respect to the core proposition itself. Perhaps Ewald's conclusion that this excerpt construes the reader as necessarily thinking 'as the author does' is on the basis of the earlier presupposition discussed

^⑤ There are interesting questions arising as to whether or not such formulation (i. e. involving 'there is evidence that...') should in fact be treated as dialogically expansive (i. e. recognising the possibility of alternative positions). There is not space here to explore this question further.

above, reinforced by the fact that the reader is assumed to find unproblematic this proposition as to ‘evidence’.

6. Construing the addressee as potentially undecided/uncommitted

I turn now to the mechanisms by which the addressee can be construed as potentially not committed to, convinced of, or aware of, the merits of the proposition currently being advanced.

Firstly there are those formulations which have variously been dealt with under such headings as ‘epistemic modality’, ‘evidentiality’ and ‘hedging’ (see, for example, Coates, 1983; Palmer, 1986; Markkanen and Schröder, 1997). It has often been the case previously that such formulations have been interpreted in the context of concerns with ‘truth function’, and have been said to indicate a lack of commitment by the speaker to the ‘truth value’ of the current proposition. However the appraisal literature (under the influence of the Bakhtinian view that all utterances are dialogistically responsive and/or anticipatory) aligns with scholars such as Myers (1989: 12) in proposing that such formulations may alternatively or additionally function to signal recognition by the speaker that the viewpoint they are advancing is but one of a range of alternative viewpoints in play in the current communicative context. They function to signal that the speaker is allowing for the possibility of alternative viewpoints and thereby allowing space for those alternatives in the current ‘conversation’. Accordingly, in the appraisal literature, such formulations are characterised as ‘dialogistically expansive’ in that they open up space for other voices and viewpoints — and are given the label ‘entertain’ (i. e. they ‘entertain’ the possibility of alternative viewpoints). The appraisal framework treats the resources of attribution (directly and indirectly attributed speech and thought) as similarly ‘dialogistically expansive’ in that, like modals of probability and related formulations they also explicitly ground propositions in a contingent subjectivity — that of the quoted source. The proposition is presented as one position among a diversity of potential alternative positions.

Dyrenfurth makes occasional use of these resources to allow, at strategic points in his piece, for the possibility the addressee does not share his viewpoint or at least finds it problematic. Consider the dialogistic expansiveness of Dyrenfurth in the following paragraph, where he is ‘expansive’ firstly in attributing propositions to an external source and then in explicitly grounding a key proposition in his own subjectivity.

In his majestic book *My Promised Land*, Haaretz journalist Ari Shavit argued that one accepts Lydda — the village where, during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, hundreds of Palestinians were killed, and the others expelled — or rejects Zionism. As I see it, the challenge today is to accept that settlements must either be dismantled or reject the only viable 21st century form of Zionism.

Here Dyrenfurth is dealing with long-standing points of contention and debate not directly related to the central concern of his piece (to defend Israel’s current military action in Gaza). He undertakes an excursion into several ‘big’ issues — the basis for the establishment of the Israeli state and legitimacy/illegitimacy of the building of Jewish settlements in Palestinian territory. Consider the first proposition — that to support Zionism (to believe in the legitimacy of the founding of a Jewish nation state in the Middle East) is to necessarily regard as ‘unavoidable’ or possibly ‘justifiable’ the forced removal of the large

Palestinian population from the village of Lydda and surrounding areas by Israeli forces during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. (Lydda/Lod was located at the ‘heart’ of the new Israeli state, near the main airport.) He chooses not to advance this position in his own voice, choosing instead to ground the proposition in the subjectivity of an external voice, that of a prominent journalist with the ‘progressive’ *Haaretz* newspaper and author of the ‘majestic’ *My Promised Land*.

In broad terms, we can say that, when attribution is used in journalistic texts such as this, the author is not, at least in the first instance, assuming likemindedness on the part of the addressee. The author presents as passing on the views or observations of another speaker for the reader’s perusal and consideration. There is no overtly signalled anticipation that the addressee will or won’t align with the attributed viewpoint.

However, in cases like the above, the situation may be complicated when the author indicates some personal support for, or favouring of, the proposition under consideration. Thus Dyrenfurth doesn’t simply quote Shavit. Rather he indicates a ‘favouring’ of the proposition (see White, 2012), firstly by evaluating the book in which the proposition was advanced as ‘majestic’ and then by indicating in subsequent sentences his agreement with Shavit. Accordingly, some complications arise as to dialogistic, putative-addressee positioning. Firstly, that Shavit’s book is to be regarded positively is treated as a given — via the presupposition in ‘In his majestic book *My Promised Land...*’ While the assessment here is overtly an aesthetic one (‘majestic’), there are also potentially evaluative overtones of reliability or credibility — a ‘majestic’ book is presumably a work which will offer well-founded viewpoints. There is thus a signal of anticipation by Dyrenfurth that such a view of the book, at least in general terms, will be unproblematic for the addressee. Along similar lines, there is the potential ‘evidential standing’ (White, 2012) of Shavit as a source. For those familiar with the Israeli news media and who hold a more ‘progressive’ political stance, his status as a journalist with the more progressive *Haaretz* newspaper has the potential to invoke a positive view of both Shavit and propositions associated with him. To the extent that the ‘logic’ of the piece can be seen as relying on the reader to make this evaluative connection, we can observe a further signal of author-reader likemindedness — as co-members of a community of shared ‘moderate/liberal’ values vis-a-vis Israeli politics. At the same time, of course, readers who don’t share such a progressive orientation to Israeli politics are excluded from the text’s putative readership.

Nevertheless, while this somewhat vague sense of author-reader likemindedness is present, there is still the question of how the reader is being positioned vis-à-vis the specific proposition re Lydda and Zionism — that to support Zionism in good faith it is necessary to see the expulsion of the Palestinians from Lydda in 1948 as in some way ‘necessary’. From one perspective, allowance is made for the possibility that the reader may not share this view with the author (and Shavit), since the proposition is attributed rather than being presupposed or categorically asserted. On the other hand, it is possible to interpret the text here as presenting the reader as amenable to persuasion, as potentially to be won over to the author’s position. This is on the basis that Dyrenfurth has made the effort to offer the reader motivation to accept this viewpoint — to present the proposition as well-founded — i. e. as a proposition advanced in a ‘majestic’ book by an author of impeccable ‘progressive’ credentials. It is plausible to interpret the text here as construing the reader as potentially resistant to the proposition at issue, but as also persuadable. Here the ‘persuadability’ is on the basis of an assumed shared favourable view of Shavit and his arguments. We

observe a sequence which can often be found in texts of this type. The addressee is construed initially as potentially not aligning with the author re a specific proposition but also as potentially persuadable in the sense that material is supplied in support of that proposition, with a view to winning the ‘uncommitted’ addressee over to the author’s viewpoint.

A similarly dialogistically expansive positioning occurs with the following proposition — that in order for Zionism to be sustainable, the Jewish settlements on the West Bank must be dismantled.

As I see it, the challenge today is to accept that settlements must either be dismantled or reject the only viable 21st century form of Zionism.

This time the proposition is explicitly grounded in the author’s own contingent subjectivity — via the formulation ‘as I see it...’. Again, this can be seen as a signal the author allows for the possibility that the addressee may not be in alignment here with the author. Interestingly, in this case, there is no additional material supplied in support of this proposition — no attempt is made to win over the addressee. On this basis, we might conclude that Dyrenfurth thus presents this as a proposition which does not necessarily put author-reader rapport at risk. A community of shared value is construed which ‘allows’ for diversity of viewpoint around this particular issue, which ends up playing out as a kind of side issue or digression in terms of the key concerns of the article.

7. Negation and addressee unlikemindedness

I turn now to those resources by which the addressee can be construed, even if for only a momentary point in the text, as unlikeminded. The first of these is negation which has been quite widely dealt with in the pragmatics and the SFL literature (see, for example, Tottie, 1982; Pagano, 2002; Don, 2017). In line with this literature, I note that (1) negating propositions ‘invoke’ the positive propositions which they contradict and (2) they vary as to the ‘directionality’ of the contradiction — that is to say they vary as to the actual or implied source of the proposition being denied. (For discussion of this from the perspective of appraisal theory, see Martin and White 2005: 118-120.) In some cases, the source whose proposition is being contradicted is some specific prior speaker — either overtly identified or, alternatively, implied. In other cases, it is the addressee who is construed as potentially operating with a belief, attitude, expectation or reservation which is being countered. In other cases, the directionality may be ambiguous or may suggest both some external source and the addressee.

Dyrenfurth uses negation (termed ‘denial’ under the ENGAGEMENT system) to construe a potentially unlikeminded addressee, even while this is typically only with respect to propositions which are incidental to his broader argument. For example, after an opening paragraph in which he states he is a ‘proud Zionist’ and applauds some of the past achievements of the state of Israel, he offers the following.

I’m not blind to Israel’s faults. I deplore the rightwards shift of the nation’s political culture. I mourn the collapse of Labor Zionism.

Here, of course, the implication is that someone, somewhere might propose that he is ‘blind to Israel’s faults’ — with this ‘someone’ possibly including the addressee. Hereby a reader is constructed who might hold such a negative view of the author, given that (1) he has just praised Israel’s achievements and (2) is about to defend its action in invading Gaza. The purpose of the denial is to ‘dissolve’, so to speak, this potential dis-alignment, to ‘correct’ their imputed misapprehension, to

reassure the reader that the author does not have membership in the community of shared value in which Israel is uncritically (‘blindly’) praised and supported. This use of negation, therefore, can be seen as in some ways ‘incidental’ to the more global positioning of the addressee. Potential author-reader unlikemindedness is presented as arising from misapprehension or misunderstanding on the part of the addressee, with the author acting to attend to this misapprehension.

The final paragraph of the piece is an exercise in rhetorically very interesting negation.

I see all this and I will not be silent. Nor will I keep stumm in the face of the Palestinians’ worst enemy, those non-Jews and non-Arabs who lie, slander and wish ill upon the national home of the Jewish people, and threaten its citizens and diaspora with physical violence. Not today. Not tomorrow. Not next week. Not next year. Never again.

This is arguably ambiguous as to who might be the source of the contrary propositions and proposals which are being denied. I certainly interpret this as vague as to whether it is the reader who is being construed as possibly feeling that Dyrenfurth should be silent or some other external source, although, given where these denials occur in the text, it makes sense to see the putative source of these countered proposals as an external 3rd party, rather than the addressee. What seems most significant rhetorically here is the implication that someone, somewhere (we don’t know who this is) is demanding that Dyrenfurth (an influential figure in the Australian Labor Party) refrain from speaking on this topic. At the very least then, by this mechanism the text construes an addressee for whom it is plausible that that such demands for ‘silence’ are being made of Dyrenfurth.

8. Countering and momentary author-addressee unlikemindedness

Another key mechanism for the construal of momentary authorial-addressee unlikemindedness is via what are typically termed ‘adversatives’ and ‘concessives’ — what is termed the resource of ‘countering’ in the ENGAGEMENT system of the appraisal framework. ‘Countering’ positioning is typically conveyed via the use of connectives such as *however*, *yet*, *although* and *but*. The proposition in the scope of such a connective is construed as in some way unexpected in its current location in the text, as contrary to an expectation invoked by some adjoining proposition. There is one example of this in the Dyrenfurth piece. Consider Dyrenfurth’s proposition that he is cognizant that Hamas, especially its leadership, has flaws.

In 2014, I see the Palestinians. I see their suffering. The carnage. The deaths. The tears. I see the historical injustice that befell them in 1948 and the fact that 66 years later they still possess no independent state of their own. And yet I also see their flaws, especially of their leaders. The genocidal hatred of Hamas and terrorist groups in Gaza and the continued rejection of Israel’s existence.

Here this negative view of Hamas is presented as ‘unexpected’ (via the use of the adversative ‘and yet’) in light of his immediately prior statement of sympathy for Palestinians and his belief they have been subject of ‘historical injustice’. Here the implied unlikemindedness is a matter of an indicated anticipation that the addressee may misapprehend the author’s sympathy for the Palestinians as a sign of his being insufficiently critical. This potential misapprehension (a moment of unlikemindedness) is, of course, immediately corrected. The possibility of author-reader dis-alignment around this issue is defused.

9. Conclusion

This paper has provided a demonstration of a methodology for tracking how the putative addressee of persuasive texts is variously positioned re the propositions being advanced by the author — as variably likeminded, uncommitted or unlikeminded. The approach demonstrated both drew on and developed prior work within narratology studies, university composition studies and socio-semiotics-oriented discourse analysis. It relied principally on work which attends to the resources of dialogistic positioning as outlined in the appraisal-framework literature, with particular reference to meanings dealt with in the system of ENGAGEMENT. Some reference was made of the Toulminian notion of the ‘warrant’, the typically unstated underlying premise (or premises) by which supporting, argumentative justifications entail the propositions they are intended to motivate.

In applying this approach to an analysis of this defence of the Israeli invasion of Gaza, I was able to show that, in mounting his argument, Dyrenfurth chose to construe the putative addressee as variously likeminded, uncommitted and unlikeminded vis-à-vis the propositions he advanced. Predictably, given the argumentative/persuasive nature of the text (designed to prosecute a particular case), the addressee is broadly construed as either uninformed, undecided or uncommitted with respect to the piece’s central thesis (that criticisms of the Israeli military action are invalid) in that the piece’s primary orientation is towards winning over readers to this viewpoint or at least to strengthening their commitment to it.

What is not predictable in this way is the frequency with which the author construes the reader as likeminded and the rhetorical purposes to which this positioning is put. Thus the paper revealed addressee likemindedness to be a frequent feature, as the author construed an addressee who shared his positive view of Israel’s past achievements as a state and culture, his negative views of the country’s current leader and of its program of West Bank settlements, along with his extremely negative view of Hamas. Also significant was the construal of an addressee for whom the Israel action was a ‘necessary’ response to the ‘provocation’ of the rocket and mortar attacks, for whom the notion of ‘proportionality’ in military action is nonsensical and who will find entirely unproblematic the proposition that those criticising Israel are ‘hypocritical’. Thus we can say that the ‘fully compliant reader’ of this text is one who shares with the author this particular congregation of attitudes — in that it is only such a reader who will not take exception at some point in the text to being positioned there as likeminded. Thus, the author construes a particular attitudinal community — one whose members share this particular array of attitudes and who, at least with respect to these particular attitudinal assessments, will view the piece as reasonable and well-founded.

As well, there were findings with respect to attitudinal propositions not directly connected to the central argument, where the author chose to construe the addressee as potentially not committed to the position he was advancing. This was with respect to his view that the West Bank settlements needed to be dismantled and that good faith Zionism involves regarding as necessary expulsion of Palestinians from the village of Lydda. Here, in formulating these propositions in dialogistically expansive ways he allows for the possibility that readers don’t share this view, while at the same time recognising alternative positions on these as legitimately in play. Thus, he construes a putative readership where views potentially differ on these matters — a community of shared value where rapport is not put at risk by disagreements along these lines.

Finally there were those couple of points in the text where negation was deployed to imply that the addressee might be unlikeminded in anticipating that Dyrenfurth might ‘be blind to Israel’s faults’ and might have felt that Dyrenfurth should ‘be silent’ on these matters. As discussed, the text is somewhat ambiguous as to the directionality of these denials — as to whether it is the addressee who is presented as possibly holding these adversarial positions, or some other unnamed external source. It is, however, a possible interpretation that by these denials Dyrenfurth presents himself, at least momentarily, as at odds with the putative reader. In doing this, Dyrenfurth is able to present himself as sensitive to how the reader may be thinking, as sensitive to the possibility of divergent views and as making an effort to provide a corrective — to defuse this potential unlikemindedness. As well, of course, in insisting that he ‘will not be silent’ Dyrenfurth presents as prepared to confront his rhetorical adversaries head on — to defy what he implies are efforts to deny him his freedom of speech.

The paper, therefore, has provided this detailed account of the addressee positioning which operates in the text. While this is presumably of some interest in its own right, the wider purpose of the text was to demonstrate the workings of such an analysis — to offer a guide as to the linguistic resources involved in such positionings and as to how analyses can map the particular putative-addressee positionings in play in texts of this type.

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